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Questions of Ontology and Themes of
the First Chapter of The
Mùlamadhyamakakàrikà of Nàgàrjuna
By Rev. Khai Thien
In the history of Indian thought, questions of ontology are
particularly important in all philosophical schools and religions, with
causality being the main subject of all philosophical debates. People focus on
the relation between cause and effect, between the so-called noumenon (an
object conceived by the reason but not knowable by the senses) and phenomenon
(an observable object, fact or event). Questions continue to be raised about
the nature of God, human creation, and the existence of natural phenomena.
With his famous criticism on questions of
ontology and his analysis of causality, Nàgàrjuna opened a new door in the
history of philosophy in general and Buddhist doctrine in particular. In the
first chapter of his Mùlamadhyamakakàrikà, Nàgàrjuna introduces a new
methodology, the path of ‘dialectic negation’. Through his dialectic negations
of the four major theories of causation, he stresses the “empty reality” in the
relationship between cause and effect and reasserts the true value of
conditions (pratityas). T.R.V. Murti considers Nàgàrjuna’s dialectic
negation to be “a special reason” in Buddhist philosophy,[1]
since the whole of Buddhist thought revolves around the figure of
Pratitya Samutpada, and the Madhyamika[2] system is in fact the
interpretation of Pratitya Samutpada as Sunyata or Emptiness. In this
paper, however, I focus on the main themes in the first chapter of Nàgàrjuna’s Mùlamadhyamakakàrikà,
including the dialectic negation, criticism of the four theories of causation,
and the affirmation of the four conditions.
What is the dialectic negation of
Nàgàrjuna?
Philosophical dialectic, in the history of both philosophy and religion, has
been the most important ‘tool’ for persuading through dialogue. In all rational
discussions, dialectic has no purpose but to show the truth. In the eyes of
Nàgàrjuna, all the philosophical views, before and during his time, focus on
the causal relation in the patterns: identity, difference, existence, non-existence,
or a combination or denial of them. Like Socrates, Nàgàrjuna begins his
dialectic negation by asking his questions. The striking characteristic of
Nàgàrjuna’s dialectic method is “question and negation.” Using this method, he
constantly raised questions and rejected the opponent’s views, and of course
Nagarjuna would not stop until all his opponents faced with the ‘empty
reality’. For this reason, T.R.V. Murti said:
The Madhyamika dialectic tries to remove
the conflict inherent in Reason by rejecting both the opposites taken singly or
in combination … Rejection of all views is not based on any positive grounds or
the acceptance of another view; it is solely based on the inner contradiction
implicit in each view. The function of the Madhyamika dialectic, on the logical
level, is purely negative analytic.[3]
Furthermore, while using his method, Nàgàrjuna particularly concentrated on the
consciousness of the opposition of the thesis and antithesis in his
dialogue. For him the truth would not be brightened or the true knowledge would
not be obtained if a person accepted one of the eightfold views[4]
that he totally rejected. Therefore Nagarjuna resolved the inner contradiction
implicit in each view not by approval or disapproval, but by “negation of
negation.” Thus Nàgàrjuna’s dialectic, according to Murti, is in fact a series
of reductio ad absurdum arguments in which he both disproves his
opponent’s thesis and does not prove any thesis of his own.
Briefly, the nature of Nàgàrjuna’s dialectic is that in the first place, it is
a movement from the relativity of conventional knowledge to the non-dual
intuition of the absolute; here, emptiness (sunyata) is the negative
ground on which Nàgàrjuna rejected all views related to self, substance, and
ego. Second, he introduces the true values of the two truths, the conventional
and the absolute, which are in fact the only affirmations of his criticism. And
finally, Nàgàrjuna identifies the role of the middle way that connects the two
truths together. This is his method of dialectic negation. But Nàgàrjuna did
not forget to advise those who want to perceive the true meaning of the
doctrine of emptiness, because he warns that “a wrongly understood emptiness
ruins an unintelligent person. It is like a snake badly caught or a magical
formula wrongly executed.”[5]
Nàgàrjuna’s criticism on the four theories of causation
The fundamental question of ontology is particularly important to all
philosophical schools in India,
including the early Buddhist sects. Indian philosophers had to deal with the
questions of causality because it was on those grounds that they
developed different viewpoints to explain the cognitive world. Of course such a
relation of causality is not that used in modern sciences such as mathematics
or biology; rather, it concentrates on the nature of all metaphysical concerns:
What is the nature of God? What is the original cause of the universe? What
gave rise to the phenomenal world? Nàgàrjuna’s criticism arises from such
questions. As David J. Kalupahana noticed, “Nàgàrjuna proceeded to examine the
subtle and complex metaphysical issues that blinded the Sarvastivadins and the
Sautrantikas in background in which speculative philosophy had reached a high
watermark, both among the Buddhists and the traditional Indian philosophers.”[6]
In looking for the original cause as well as giving the answer to those
questions, Indian philosophers started with the theory of causality and based
their epistemology on the principal-relationship between cause and effect. As
Nàgàrjuna summarizes it in the first verse of the first chapter of the Mùlamadhyamakakàrikà,
there are four dominant theories of causality of Indian philosophy:
Self-causation, causation by relative factors or others, causation from both
self and others, and causation by chance.
Self-expression of the cause: Accepting the identity-nature of cause and
effect, Samkhya teaches that self-becoming, which means the world of phenomena,
is self-causation.[7] This theory leads to the conclusion that cause
and effect are identical. Samkhya’s doctrine considers that the world of
phenomena is self-contained and self-sufficient, so it does not need any
external conditions to make an existence exist. It attempted to make reality
homogeneous. Whereas the Buddhist accepts that a cause and its effect are, to a
certain extent, not self-causation, Buddhist philosophers say that there must
be a difference between the two.
Causation by relative factors: The basic theory of Nyàya-Vaisésika
realism pays special attention to relationship – the relative factors – and
considers that everything is objective, including atman and knowledge.
Objectivity (visayata) has three aspects: substantive (visesya),
adjective (visesana), and relationship (sambandha). Thus this
theory accepts that an entity can exist in coexistence of different aspects and
their connections. According to Murti, however, both the Advaita Vedanta
and the Buddhists deny the reality of relationship, because, for the Advaita,
the substance or the whole alone is real; nothing exists apart from the
substance or the whole. Conversely, the Buddhists, while accepting the modes of
dependent origination, denied the reality of both the substance and the whole.[8]
Existence from both self and external causation: The Jaina view covers
the above two views (self and external causation) by accepting the continuous
as well as the emergent aspect of the cause’s effect (utpàdavyayadhrauvvyayuktam
sat). This theory is in fact an easier way of thinking about causal
relation. On this view, cause and effect, to a certain extent, can be
considered as distinct phenomena, and they both exist dependently on each
other, as a seed and its sprout do. In fact, the doctrine of causation by both
self and other is a combination of the doctrine of causation-from-another and
the doctrine of self-causation.
Existence caused by chance: The last view of causality is that of the
materialists (the svabhavavadins) and the skeptics. Both rejected all
the alternatives and regarded existence as produced by chance (ahetuta).
Nothing that really exists is self-contained, or arises from another factors,
or from both, except by chance.
Murti gives this summary of the four theories of causation:
The Samkhya advocates identity between the
two (satkàryavàda), and thus holds the theory of self-becoming; things are
produced out of themselves (svatutpanà bhàvàh). The Buddhist and even the Nyàya
to a certain extent oppose this by maintaining difference between cause and
effect. The Jaina view combines the above two views by insisting on the
continuous as well as the emergent aspect of the effect
(utpàdavyayadhrauvvyayuktam sat). The materialists and the skeptics, rejecting
all the alternatives, take things as produced by chance (ahetuta).[9]
In his critique, Nàgàrjuna denies all the bases of the four theories of
causation above; his perception is that all four theories are false and full of
contradiction, both ontologically and epistemologically. Nàgàrjuna thus
rejected all concepts of identity and difference, substance and quality,
self-nature and other-nature, permanence and annihilation. In the first verse
of his commentary, the Mùlamadhyamakakàrikà, he affirms that “Neither
from itself, nor from another, nor from both, nor without a cause, does
anything whatever, anywhere arise.”[10] The brief discussion below
will concentrate on Nàgàrjuna’s negation of the four theories of causation.
Critique of self-existence: As I have mentioned, the philosophy of
Samkhya tries to retain its theory through the view of existence as
self-contained, self-existing, or self-caused. This theory seemed to go beyond
all dualities of human conceptual domains, but it failed to establish access to
the cognitive world as an epistemology. “Something that is not dependently
arisen,” says Nàgàrjuna, “such a thing does not exist, therefore a nonempty
does not exist” (MK. XXIV. 19). All existences, in reality, exist on the base
of correlative conditions, the causal relationships. No entity can exist
uniquely and independently, neither can any entity exist outside the circle of
relationship between cause and effect. Nàgàrjuna, on this logical base of
causality, directly negates the possibility of any self-existing thing or the
identity of cause and effect by proposing that self-causation is contradictory:
since if a dharma, whether noumenon or phenomenon, is self-existing, it
means that the cause and effect are identical, in which case there would be no
distinction between cause and effect; and again, there would be no production
at all. What then will we say about the world of diverse phenomena or the
operation of reality where a sprout (effect) always germinates from its seed
(cause)? Nàgàrjuna absolutely asserts that this account of self-causation is
unacceptable and contradictory as he raises direct questions: “If it is not
dependently arisen, how could suffering come to be? Suffering has been taught
to be impermanent, and so cannot come from its own essence.” Or, “If something
comes from its own essence, how could it ever be arisen?” (MK. XXIV. 21 &
22). On this proposition of self-causation, Gadjin M. Nagao, in his commentary
on Madhyamika, says:
Origination is a quality of existence … If
it is claimed that something originates from ‘itself’, this would result in a
contradiction of antinomy, because when something originates from itself, there
would be no need for it to originate as it already exists; or otherwise, a
thing would be continuously originating without end.[11]
On this proposition of self-causation, Nàgàrjuna concluded,
“How could one propose a ‘productive cause’? If there were one, it would be
pointless” (MK. I. 7.).
Critique of causation from another: On the contrary, the theory that
accepts that existence is caused from or by another, or that cause and effect
are totally different, is also full of contradictions. Nàgàrjuna asserted, “If
another arising gives rise to this one, there would be an infinite regress”
(MK. VII. 19). If a dharma, whether noumenon or phenomenon, is conceived
as a distinct and discontinuous fact, then these become external to each other.
The truth is that causation cannot obtain between two different entities that
are isolated from each other. If causation is a combination of the two
entities, then one could make fire from water, or water from fire. That is both
impossible and untrue. The fact is, as Gadjin M. Nagao noted, “if something is
said to originate from something other, then something different like fire
would originate from something other like water; or otherwise, all things would
arise from all other things.”[12]
Critique of existence caused from both self and external causation: Jay
L. Garfield called this third alternative, the causation by both, a doctrine of
happy compromise: “Effects are the result of the joint operation of the effect
itself in potentio and the external conditions necessary to raise the
effect’s mode of existence from potentiality to actuality.”[13]
According to Murti, however, the so-called co-operation or joint operation (Garfield’s words) must
also face critical questions:
[In relation to] the co-operation of
several factors (pratyayàs) in generating an effect, the question
arises: what makes factors A, B, C, D, etc., which by themselves are
disconnected entities and no causes and conditions, into causes? What
co-ordinates them for a united effort, for a common end? If some other factor were
assumed as bringing about this co-operation, a further question arises: what
makes this co-ordinating cause too a cause?[14]
Briefly, in Nàgàrjuna’s view, the principle of causation cannot obtain between
different entities, whether they are identical with or different from each
other, or even if they are in co-operation of multi-conditions. “The essence of
entities,” says Nàgàrjuna, “is not present in the conditions” (MK. I. 03). We
would do well to reflect on the following questions of Nàgàrjuna: “If a thing
is non-existent, how could it have a condition? If a thing is already existent,
what would a condition do?” (MK. I. 6.).
Critique of existence caused by chance: The fourth alternative view of
causation belongs to the materialists, who propose that things simply arise
spontaneously without any particular causes. The question is, says Nagao, “If
something originates without a cause, then everything would originate at all
times and everywhere.”[15] This theory is an exception in the
philosophical world of India.
In fact no serious philosophy of India denied the principle of
causality. Nàgàrjuna, however, mentioned this view of chance-origin as a kind
of false view. About the role of causality in the whole system of Indian philosophy,
Murti noted that “the Buddhist, the Jaina, and the Brahmanical system all
subscribe to the principle of causality as governing all phenomena. Each
interpreted it in its own way, and all of them, before the advent of
Madhyamika, took it as ultimately real, as a feature of the unconditioned
noumenon.”[16]
From this discussion, it is clear that the essence of the contradiction
implicit in all four theories is that they all try to explain causal relation
by the patterns of identity, difference, existence, non-existence, and so on,
by a combination of them or a denial of them. Each tries to explain the world,
both noumenon and phenomenon, in the conceptual patterns that were denied by
Nàgàrjuna through his eight basic alternatives: “non- ceasing and the
non-arising, the non-annihilation and the non-permanence, the non-identity and
the non-difference, the non-appearance and the non-disappearance.”[17]
As long as a view is based on prejudice – towards being or non-being, identity
or difference, and so on – that view will become an extreme theory disconnected
from truth. Murti’s affirmation usefully summarizes the nature of the four
theories: “The conclusion that is forced on us is that causation is
inexpressible, like the illusory appearance. ‘Origination, existence, and
destruction,’ says Nàgàrjuna, ‘are of the nature of màyà, dreams or fairy
castle’ (yathà màyà yathà svapno gandharva-nagaram yathà; tathotpàdas tathà
shaman tathà bhanga udàhrtah) (MK. VII, 34).[18] However, to
give a clear explanation on the principle of causality, Nàgàrjuna goes on to
say: “There are four conditions: efficient condition; percept-object condition;
immediate condition; dominant condition, just so. There is no fifth condition”
(MK. I. 02).
Efficient conditions (hetus) are those salient causes that bring about
direct effects; in this case, the seed (hetu) producing the sprout
(effect) is adduced as an example of efficient condition. Percept-object
conditions (alambana) are those correlative conditions that come from
the connection between a subject and an object; for instance, when we see the
tree out there, the image of the tree reflects in our minds, thus our
perception of the tree’s image is a percept-object. Immediate conditions (samanantara)
are understood as countless intermediary conditions that emerge in the process
of causal link from causes to effects, like various conditions of the seed
facilitating the emergence of the sprout. Dominant conditions (adhipati)
are those indirect influences that help us reach the purpose or end of an
action. For instance, the wish to be a Buddhist requires a person to study
Buddhism; the wish here is the dominant condition. According to Nàgàrjuna,
these four conditions (pratyayas) are the base on which all existences
are established. Each dharma as an object of perception must always
appear on the base of the four conditions, otherwise no actual dharma
can be taken into account.
The most important question involved in the four conditions, however, is that
there is no dharma existing as the unique self or substance that can
appear independently and uniquely without conditions; thus Nàgàrjuna says all
is emptiness – an emptiness not of phenomena but of an independent and permanent
self. Furthermore, in the four conditions, Nàgàrjuna not only destroyed the
false views of those who hold an attachment to the reality of being or
non-being, annihilation or permanence, but also brightened the misunderstanding
of the Sarvastivadins and the Sautrantikas who, in the eye of Nàgàrjuna, did
not really perceive the Truth of Dharma.[19] For this reason,
instead of focusing on the traditional teaching of Dependent Origination,
Nàgàrjuna developed the concept of Sunyata (emptiness) on the foundation
of Dependent Origination. As he sees it, if the teaching of Dependent
Origination concentrates on the world of birth and death of all phenomena, then
Emptiness tries to brighten that world by showing that it does not have a real
essence, except in the modes of conditions. Therefore, one might say, the
teaching of Emptiness opens a new door for us to see another dimension of
reality. On this point, Nagao commented:
The identity of dependent co-arising and
emptiness can be approached from either direction. On the one hand, dependent
co-arising means that all beings are not independent (svatantrika) and
self-existing (atman) things, but only transient beings brought about by
the constellation of a cluster of causes. This no-self and absence of any
independent self underlying transient being is the emptiness of things … On the
other hand, this emptying and negating of things does not mean that things do
not exist at all; non-being is nothingness. Emptiness signifies only the
absence of essence.[20]
In brief, in the first chapter of the Mùlamadhyamakakàrikà, Nàgàrjuna
focused on his dialectic negation of the substantialist theory of causality and
emphasized the emptiness of causality. This is the special philosophy that
clarifies the profound teaching of the Buddha. Through Nàgàrjuna’s criticism,
the world does not cease to be, but it turns out to be more active, more
beautiful, more marvelous, beyond all description. The first major enterprise
of Nàgàrjuna, in this chapter, is to establish this non-substantiality, this
emptiness – the Reality that, according to Nàgàrjuna, is ineffable (avacya)
and inconceivable (acintya) by ordinary knowledge and language. The only
thing one should keep in mind is that, according to Garfield, “the phenomena we normally take to
be inherently existent, to have convention-independent natures, and to exist as
they do precisely because of their natures are in fact empty of inherent
existence, exist only conventionally, and exist precisely because of their emptiness
and interdependence.”[21] Again, the affirmation of the four
conditions is what we should base ourselves on in order to perceive the true
meaning of the dialectic negation of sunyata and the emptiness of
causality. Kalupahana saw that the most significant statement of Nàgàrjuna in
the first chapter is the third verse:[22] “The self-nature of
existence is not evident in the conditions, etc. In the absence of self-nature,
other-nature too is not evident.” (MK. I. 03). This is because if we don’t
analyze it carefully we would misunderstand the whole Nàgàrjuna’s critique. In
this verse Nàgàrjuna focused on the denial, not of conditions (pratyayas),
but of self-nature (svabhava), and the whole chapter stresses the
emptiness of self-nature.
[1] T.R.V. Murti. The
Central Philosophy of Buddhism: A Study of the Madhyamika System. George
Allen & Unwin Ltd, London,
1954, p. 166.
[2]
The Buddhist philosophical school developed by Nàgàrjuna in about the second
century C.E. in South India. See Jay L.
Garfield. The Fundamental Wisdom of The Middle Way. Oxford
University Press, New York, 1995, p. 87.
[3]
Murti, The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, p. 128.
[4]
“Anirodham anutpàdam anucchedam asàsvatam, anekàrtham anànàrtham anàganam
anirganam, yah pratìtyasamutpàdam prapancopasamam sivam, desàyamàsà
sambuddhah tam vande vandatam varam.” (I salute him [the Buddha], the fully
enlightened, the best of speaker, who preached the non- ceasing and the
non-arising, the non-annihilation and the non-permanence, the non-identity and
the non-difference, the non-appearance and the non-disappearance, the dependent
arising, the appeasement of obsessions and the auspicious” (MK. Dedicatory
Verse).
[5]
Peter Della Santina. Madhyamaka
School in India:
A Study of the Madhyamaka Philosophy and of the Division of the System into the
Prasangika and Svatantrika
School. Motilal
Banarsidass, Delhi,
1986, p. 38.
[6]
David J. Kalupahana. Mùlamadhyamakakàrikà of Nàgàrjuna: The Philosophy of
The Middle Way.
Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, Delhi,
2004, p. 81.
[7]
A pre-Buddhistic system of philosophy – the first synthesis of the chief tenets
of the Upanishads. See Murti. The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, p. 60.
[8]
Ibid., p. 65.
[9]
Ibid., p. 133.
[10]
Jay L. Garfield. The Fundamental Wisdom of The Middle Way: Nàgàrjuna’s
Mùlamadhyamakakàrikà. Oxford University Press, New York, 1995, p. 04.
[11]
Gadjin M. Nagao. Madhyamika and Yogacara: A Study of Mahayana Philosophies.
Trans. Leslie S. Kawamura. State University
of New York
Press, 1991, p. 179.
[12]
ibid., p. 180.
[13]
Garfield, The
Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle
Way, p. 107.
[14]
Murti, The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, p. 175.
[15]
Nagao, Madhyamika and Yogacara, p. 180.
[16]
Murti, The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, p. 167.
[17]
Thich Tam Thien. Lich Su Tu Tuong va Triet Hoc Tanh Khong. Saigon, 2002.
[18]
Murti, The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, p. 175.
[19]
The Sarvastivadins and the Sautrantikas denied the substantiality of human (pudgala)
but they accepted the substantiality of elements (dharma). See
Kalupahana, Mùlamadhyamakakàrikà of Nàgàrjuna, p. 84.
[20]
Gadjin Nagao. The Foundational Standpoint of Madhyamika Philosophy.
Trans. John P. Keenan. State University of New
York Press, 1989, p. 18.
[21]
Jay L. Garfield. ‘Nàgàrjuna’s theory of causality: implications sacred and
profane’. Philosophy East and West, October 1, 2001.
[22]
Kalupahana, Mùlamadhyamakakàrikà of Nàgàrjuna, pp. 167–8.
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